Algorithmic Game Theory - Schäfer, Guido; Ventre, Carmine; (ed.) - Prospero Internet Bookshop

Algorithmic Game Theory: 17th International Symposium, SAGT 2024, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 3?6, 2024, Proceedings
 
Product details:

ISBN13:9783031710322
ISBN10:30317103211
Binding:Paperback
No. of pages:546 pages
Size:235x155 mm
Language:English
Illustrations: 21 Illustrations, black & white; 34 Illustrations, color
684
Category:

Algorithmic Game Theory

17th International Symposium, SAGT 2024, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 3?6, 2024, Proceedings
 
Edition number: 2024
Publisher: Springer
Date of Publication:
Number of Volumes: 1 pieces, Book
 
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Long description:

This volume constitutes the refereed proceedings of 17th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2024, held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, during September 3?6, 2024.



The 29 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 84 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: matching; fair division and resource allocation; mechanism design; game theory and repeated games; pricing, revenue, and regulation; matroid theory in game theory; information sharing and decision making; computational complexity and resource allocation.

Table of Contents:

.- The Computational Complexity of the Housing Market.



.- Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Complexity and Characterization.



.- Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty.



.- Matching.



.- Structural and Algorithmic Results for Stable Cycles and Partitions in the Roommates Problem.



.- Online Matching with High Probability.



.- The Team Order Problem: Maximizing the Probability of Matching Being Large Enough.



.- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.



.- Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints.



.- Fair Division with Interdependent Values.



.- Fair Division with Bounded Sharing: Binary and Non-Degenerate Valuations.



.- Incentives in Dominant Resource Fair Allocation under Dynamic Demands.



.- Mechanism Design.



.- Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games.



.- The k-Facility Location Problem Via Optimal Transport: A Bayesian Study of the Percentile Mechanisms.



.- Discrete Single-Parameter Optimal Auction Design.



.- Estimating the Expected Social Welfare and Cost of Random Serial Dictatorship.



.- Game Theory and Repeated Games.



.- Swim Till You Sink: Computing the Limit of a Game.



.- The Investment Management Game: Extending the Scope of the Notion of Core.



.- Edge-Dominance Games on Graphs.



.- Playing Repeated Games with Sublinear Randomness.



.- Pricing, Revenue, and Regulation.



.- Mind the Revenue Gap: On the Performance of Approximation Mechanisms under Budget Constraints.



.- Sublogarithmic Approximation for Tollbooth Pricing on a Cactus.



.- To Regulate or Not to Regulate: Using Revenue Maximization Tools to Maximize Consumer Utility.



.- Balancing Participation and Decentralization in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies.



.- Matroid Theory in Game Theory.



.- Price of Anarchy in Paving Matroid Congestion Games.



.- Price of Anarchy for Graphic Matroid Congestion Games.



.- Non-Adaptive Matroid Prophet Inequalities.



.- Matroid Bayesian Online Selection.



.- Information Sharing and Decision Making.



.- Prediction-Sharing During Training and Inference.



.- Calibrated Recommendations for Users with Decaying Attention.



.- Matrix Rationalization via Partial Orders.



.- Computational Complexity and Resource Allocation.



.- k-Times Bin-Packing and its Application to Fair Electricity Distribution.



.- Condorcet Markets.



.- Complexity of Round-Robin Allocation with Potentially Noisy Queries.