Product details:
ISBN13: | 9781350277182 |
ISBN10: | 1350277185 |
Binding: | Paperback |
No. of pages: | 248 pages |
Size: | 234x156 mm |
Language: | English |
749 |
Category:
The Metaphysics of Contingency
A Theory of Objects? Abilities and Dispositions
Series:
Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics;
Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
Date of Publication: 22 February 2024
Number of Volumes: Paperback
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Long description:
Philosophers approach the problem of possibility in two markedly different ways: with reference to worlds, whereby an event is possible if there is a world in which it occurs, and with reference to modal properties, whereby an event is a possible manifestation of a property of some substance or object.
Showing how the world-account cannot properly explain the nature of possibilities within worlds, Ferenc Huoranszki argues that the latter approach is more plausible. He develops a theory of contingent possibilities grounded in a distinction between abilities and dispositions as real, first-order modal properties of objects, with fundamentally distinct ontological roles.
By understanding abilities as first-order modal properties, and by linking such modal properties to counterfactual conditionals, Huoranszki argues we can distinguish between variably generic or specific abilities and identify more or less abstract possibilities in a world. In doing so, he furthers our understanding of how we reason with possibilities in both ordinary and theoretical contexts. Providing a novel account of dispositions, abilities and their capacity to explain modality, this book advances current debates in contemporary metaphysics.
Showing how the world-account cannot properly explain the nature of possibilities within worlds, Ferenc Huoranszki argues that the latter approach is more plausible. He develops a theory of contingent possibilities grounded in a distinction between abilities and dispositions as real, first-order modal properties of objects, with fundamentally distinct ontological roles.
By understanding abilities as first-order modal properties, and by linking such modal properties to counterfactual conditionals, Huoranszki argues we can distinguish between variably generic or specific abilities and identify more or less abstract possibilities in a world. In doing so, he furthers our understanding of how we reason with possibilities in both ordinary and theoretical contexts. Providing a novel account of dispositions, abilities and their capacity to explain modality, this book advances current debates in contemporary metaphysics.
Table of Contents:
1. Introduction: Contingency, Worlds and Properties
2. Abilities and Dispositions
3. Specificity and Intrinsicness
4. Abilities, Dispositions and Conditionals
5. Reasoning with Possibilities
6. Manifestations and Events
7. Concluding Remarks: Abilities, Qualities and the Priority of the Actual
References
Index
2. Abilities and Dispositions
3. Specificity and Intrinsicness
4. Abilities, Dispositions and Conditionals
5. Reasoning with Possibilities
6. Manifestations and Events
7. Concluding Remarks: Abilities, Qualities and the Priority of the Actual
References
Index