A termék adatai:
| ISBN13: | 9781009307222 |
| ISBN10: | 1009307223 |
| Kötéstípus: | Puhakötés |
| Terjedelem: | 408 oldal |
| Méret: | 229x152x21 mm |
| Súly: | 588 g |
| Nyelv: | angol |
| 1097 |
Témakör:
Bureaucracies at War
The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation
Sorozatcím:
Cambridge Studies in International Relations;
Kiadó: Cambridge University Press
Megjelenés dátuma: 2024. június 27.
Normál ár:
Kiadói listaár:
GBP 29.99
GBP 29.99
Az Ön ára:
12 596 (11 996 Ft + 5% áfa )
Kedvezmény(ek): 20% (kb. 3 149 Ft)
A kedvezmény érvényes eddig: 2024. december 31.
A kedvezmény csak az 'Értesítés a kedvenc témákról' hírlevelünk címzettjeinek rendeléseire érvényes.
Kattintson ide a feliratkozáshoz
Kattintson ide a feliratkozáshoz
Beszerezhetőség:
Becsült beszerzési idő: A Prosperónál jelenleg nincsen raktáron, de a kiadónál igen. Beszerzés kb. 3-5 hét..
A Prosperónál jelenleg nincsen raktáron.
Nem tudnak pontosabbat?
A Prosperónál jelenleg nincsen raktáron.
Rövid leírás:
Rethinks how bureaucracy shapes foreign policy - miscalculation is less likely when political leaders can extract quality information from the bureaucracy.
Hosszú leírás:
Why do states start conflicts they ultimately lose? Why do leaders possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? Bureaucracies at War examines how national security institutions shape the quality of bureaucratic information upon which leaders base their choice for conflict - which institutional designs provide the best counsel, why those institutions perform better, and why many leaders fail to adopt them. Jost argues that the same institutions that provide the best information also empower the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the road to war is often the tragic consequence of how leaders resolve the trade-off between good information and political security. Employing an original cross-national data set and detailed explorations of the origins and consequences of institutions inside China, India, Pakistan, and the United States, this book explores why bureaucracy helps to avoid disaster, how bureaucratic competition produces better information, and why institutional design is fundamentally political.
'An illuminating exploration of the role national security institutions play in international decision-making - both good and bad.' Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard University, and author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?
'An illuminating exploration of the role national security institutions play in international decision-making - both good and bad.' Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard University, and author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?
Tartalomjegyzék:
1. Introduction; 2. An institutional theory of miscalculation; 3. The world of national security institutions; 4. China under Mao; 5. China after Mao; 6. India; 7. Pakistan; 8. The United States during the Early Cold War; 9. Conclusion; Appendix A: National security institutions data set; Appendix B: Archival and interview data collection.
