The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics

This book evaluates the widespread preference in philosophy of mind for varieties of property dualism over other alternatives to physicalism. It takes the standard motivations for property dualism as a starting point and argues that these lead directly to nonphysical substances resembling the soul of traditional metaphysics.

In the first half of the book, the author clarifies what is at issue in the choice between theories that posit nonphysical properties only and those that posit nonphysical substances. The crucial question, he argues, is whether one posits nonphysical things that satisfy an Aristotelian-Cartesian independence definition of substance: nonphysical things that could exist in the absence of anything else. In the second half, the author argues that standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism are far less plausible than we usually suppose. Most significantly, the presuppositions of one of the leading arguments for property dualism, the conceivability argument, lead by parity of reasoning to the view that conscious subjects are nonphysical substances. He concludes that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. Mainstream philosophy of mind must take nonphysical substances far more seriously than it has done for the best part of a century.

The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.

"Richard Swinburne is famous for arguing from the conceivability of my disembodiment to my having an immaterial part. Weir's argument is not open to the criticisms levelled against Swinburne's, and the engine driving the argument is entirely different and entirely original. I was very impressed."

Dean Zimmerman, Rutgers University

"If you thought substance dualism was confined to history, then think again. Ralph Weir has developed one of the most compelling arguments for mental substance in contemporary philosophy. Essential reading for anybody working on the problem of consciousness."

Philip Goff, Durham University

"Weir shows that recent philosophy of mind is hampered by an unreflective abhorrence for the idea of the soul ? an attitude which is at odds with serious reflection on the mind-body problem. A vastly important book for anyone serious about understanding human nature."

Benedikt Paul Göcke, Ruhr University Bochum

"Weir hasn?t only contributed to the recent philosophy of mind. Moreover, he has given a profound insight into the question of the meaning of life. Hence, the real importance of this book, not only for philosophers, but also for every contemplating individual."

Marija Selak Raspudić, University of Zagreb

"An extremely important defence of substance dualism. Weir aims his critique at the growing trend toward property dualism. He rigorously works through the analytical literature to show that property dualism, while headed in the right direction, embarrassingly has no advantage over substance dualism."

Joshua Farris, Author of The Creation of Self and An Introduction to Theological Anthropology

"Weir has produced a compelling challenge to the current dogma that property dualism should be preferred to substance dualism. His book is one that no party to the contemporary mind-body debate can afford to ignore."

Alex Moran, Philosophical Quarterly

?Ralph Weir?s book is without a doubt an outstanding and very important contribution to the metaphysics of mind.?

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews